




LITOTES, IRONY AND OTHER INNOCENT 
LIES: TRUSTING TRUTH STRONGER 
THAN NOT TRUSTING LIES 
Ignace Haaz 
5.0 Introduction: Why Could Litotes and Irony 
Be Considered as Innocent Lies? 
There are many ways in which words can transmit an exaggeration 
of the intended idea or message, as when someone would write a generic 
and impersonal recommendation letter, which could mean the person 
hasn’t succeeded to be amongst the top students or employees, or short 
letter of appreciation for service that seems exaggeratedly short, and 
would be perceived as humiliating, if a few career achievements would 
be mentioned, without though applauding your performances and 
commitment to excellence111. As for the interpretation of litotes, the 
negative connotation depends on the meticulous appreciation of the 
context, including cultural context, and in speech, on the intonation and 
emphasis, or the (lack of) musicality of the speech112. The ironic and 
                                                          
111 Ignace Haaz has been teaching philosophy at the university of Fribourg 
Switzerland and is currently series editor, programme executive ethics library, 
publications manager and research expert at Globethics.net. 
112 On mutual recognition see: Ignace Haaz, The Value of Critical Knowledge, 
Ethics and Education, Globethics.net Philosophy Series No. 1, expect. 2019. 
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albeit subversive power of exaggerations or understatements, when 
words are used to bring the interlocutor or the public to unveil a hidden 
truth, comes close to certain forms of lies, that are often expressed out of 
sympathy for the auditor, but not for any egoistical interest as of 
profiting from cheating, or abusing the credibility of a institutional 
function (as corruption) or reckless abuse of individuals’ trust.  
There seem to be a world in which innocent half-truth can be 
expressed in such a way that they lie in a greatest history or narrative, 
where direct and harsh truth are unlikely to cause serious or widespread 
offence, because truth is not set as the historical value per se. Let’s 
remind us what S. Kierkegaard showed in his master work on irony in a 
detailed way: ‘according to the Greek view philosophy relates to history 
in its untruth, as eternal life to the temporal according to the Greek and 
the antique view in general. [...] eternal life began when one drank to the 
river Lethe in order to forget the past.113’ 
In the following text we would like to present the philosophical 
discussion on untrusting lies, which introduces a space for an innocent 
lie understood as figurative manipulation of the speech: a poetic trope 
that we would argue could not only be generously used to help us 
tolerating our sometime deceiving human condition—which is global 
and universally ours, that of the finitude of human capacity of 
knowledge and ethical action—but also to maximise our capacity for 
knowledge formation and adaptation to values.  
Concepts formation and communication relates to a collective 
interplay of different interiorized images, before it comes to the exterior 
in some well-chosen expressions, in self-mastered way; their origin 
remain in a mentally latent process of selection of content and ideas, as 
possible solutions, in a games of compatible propositions. This 
                                                          
113 Kierkegaard, Søren (1989): The Concept of Irony/Schelling Lecture Notes, 
Part I, The Position of Socrates Viewed as Irony, p. 10, New Jersey, Princeton 
Uni. Press, transl. Howard Hong, 1989. 
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unconscious material of our life relies on our capacity to identify and 
quickly switch between different spans, that enable us to focus on 
complex sets data, all depending very much on figurative manipulations, 
that should not be confounded with blameworthy and misleading 
representations.   
5.1 Trusting Truth Stronger than Not Trusting Lies:  
Is There Such Thing That of a Total Loss of Credibility: 
Falsum in Omnium? 
If to some extend lying is part of human nature, trusting truth should 
always be considered stronger, all things considered, than refusing to 
give credit to misleading information: 
‘There are two ways to be fooled. One is to believe what isn’t 
true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true114.’ 
But part of a story may be related to questionable episodes of self-
evident statements. We find by the Greek fabulist and storyteller Aesop, 
that liars when they speak the truth are not believed in the famous 
parable of The Boy who Cried ‘Wolf’. The story is about: 
a boy tending the sheep ‘who would continually go up to the 
embankment and shout, “Help, there‘s a wolf!” The farmers 
would all come running only to find out that what the boy said 
was not true. Then one day there really was a wolf, but when 
the boy shouted they didn’t believe him and no one came to his 
aid115.’ 
                                                          
114 Kierkegaard, Sören (1995): Works of Love, Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 16, 
New Jersey, Princeton Uni. Press, transl. and ed. by Howard Hong and Edna 
Hong. 
115 Aesop’s Fables, The Boy who Cried ‘Wolf’, Fable 151,  translation by Laura 
Gibbs, Oxford UP, Oxford : 2002/2008, p.78, [Chambry 318, Perry 210]. 
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This story made the meaning so clear that ‘to cry wolf’, is defined as 
‘to give a false alarm’, and no doubt about is allowed about more 
circumstantial appreciation of the story. Let’s imagine as thought 
experiment, that various consequences could follow in similar situations. 
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus i.e. that ‘he who lies once is not to be 
believed twice’, follows the first configuration. This obviously self-
evident statement is valid but we could define a second configuration 
where, under some conditions ‘to cry wolf’ would not mean that for 
others all my words have lost practical significance and value, because 
of a single lie. There are reasons to believe this second path more 
pragmatic and more ethical (charitable), as we can show below. 
Anyone who believes in the proverbial warning, and who 
nevertheless lies, will conclude that the predicted state does not happen, 
that lying ultimately has no such drastic consequences for two reasons, 
as S. Dietz shows in her important essay on the value of lies116. First, it 
is not the case that because of a first lie, a second lie should produce a 
state of being banned of any future communication process, because this 
could happen only under condition that the second lie is eventually 
detected, and doesn’t remain unrecognized, as many lies are likely to 
stay. Even a discovered lie usually does not lead to the fact that in fact 
none of my propositions would be believed; for the audience can 
generally well differentiate between statements which may be related to 
the particular interest to which my lie should serve, and other 
expressions which remain unaffected.  
Although it is an essential property of the lie to be audience 
dependant, we could first imagine that as for shame, lie supposes only 
an ideal audience: developing a disposition to consider lying a social 
misbehaviour, and although a concrete audience could always be 
determinant to assess lie as a token, lie as a type of ethically 
blameworthy behaviour would depend on other ethical social types of 
                                                          
116 Dietz, Simone (2002): Der Wert der Lüge, Paderborn: mentis Verl. 
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disposition: a network of friendly, love oriented, social behaviours. Lies 
should not be straightforwardly blamed in such a way that 
trustworthiness would appear as an absolute state that everybody 
understands and incorporates in the same way, on the contrary, although 
nobody is pleased to be fooled and cheated, social life is a subjective 
construction and it could take a system of trials and errors before one 
masters a truthful behaviour – opposed to lying, in his domain of family, 
social, professional, cultural, religious practices. As another fable of 
Aesop the Monkeys and the Two Men shows, strong motives for not 
telling the truth might as well exist in a given social circle, and it is 
important to diversify social circles of competencies in order to be 
immune of social pressure against a set of values that praises 
truthfulness as central ethical value. As Dietz correctly writes: 
‘the mistrust of a discovered lie is not total in the real world.  
A discovered lie first leads to the observation that the liar is 
following certain aims, and second that the liar doesn’t expect 
his project to be discovered therefore he is ready to mask it 
under a lie. But no hyperbolic doubt, no desperate doubt about 
the whole world as experience of losing the common ground is 
likely to happen117’. 
5.2 Brief Philosophical History of the Argument 
of the Misuse of the Language and the Lie  
in the Classical Religious Context  
5.2.1 The Misuse of Language in Relation to the Unity and Purity 
of the Soul vs. the Modern View   
In the classical religious philosophical deontological (duty based 
                                                          
117 Dietz, Simone, Der Wert der Lüge, Paderborn: mentis Verl., p. 11. Cf. 
Amadou Sadjo L'interdiction du mensonge chez Kant; Université de Montréal, 
Mémoire de Master, 2010; http://www.globethics.net/gel/4369959 
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ethical) integration of Christian morality, lying entails not only that a 
moral duty is violated under condition of the lack of respect of others 
freedom, with I. Kant118, not to be exposed to the possible set-back of 
interest consequent to a lie; this understanding is complex, as it relates 
first to the religious/metaphysical belief that there is a unity and purity 
of the soul, and second to the notion of the integration of the lie to 
morality as part of social ethics119. Lie finally can be analysed as part of 
a doctrine of law with Kant. Kant morally condemns the lie because in 
itself, lies constitute the most serious violation of the duty of man to 
himself: sincerity.  
The man who is not sincere, that is to say who deliberately says the 
opposite of what he thinks not only goes against the finality inherent in 
the communication, but also, by lying man renounces his personality. By 
renouncing his personality, man ceases to be a true man, that is to say, in 
whom thinking and saying overlap, he becomes a semblance of man, he 
who deliberately says the opposite of what he thinks120. This line of 
argument goes back to St. Augustin (421): Enchiridion ad Laurentium 
sive de fide, spe et saritate liber unus ; (420): Contra mendacium.  
                                                          
118 Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1797/1996). On a supposed right to lie from 
philanthropy. In: Mary Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 605-616). Cambridge: UP. The 
central text being: Metaphysics of Morals (1797), divided in the Doctrine of 
Rights and the Doctrine of Virtues. See also: Paton, An Alleged Right to Lie, 
Kant-Studien 45 (l953-54). 
119 See the very detailed presentation of these aspects by Carson: Thomas L. 
Carson, Thomas L. (2010): Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying, 
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press. 
120 Augustinus, Aurelius (421): Enchiridion ad Laurentium sive de fide, spe et 
saritate liber unus. https://www.augustinus.it/latino/enchiridion/enchiridion.htm, 
Augustinus, Aurelius (420): Contra mendacium, all Latin and English texts can 
be found on https://www.augustinus.it 
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When we sketch the philosophical historical discussion on 
truthfulness, one need to introduce Benjamin Constant’s controversy 
compared to Kantian’s rigorist view on an unconditional duty of 
truthfulness. Constant shows that duty to not lie should not be under any 
condition true, as for example if one would help a refugee to find a 
shelter, in the context of a totalitarian regime against a duty of solidarity 
to signal fugitives121. One could fail to realize the duty toward one self 
to live in dignity, but accept it to avoid ‘larger evils’. In some cases a 
principle cannot be applied without in the first place clarifying 
intermediary principles as the no harm principle that should be 
considered prior to a right to truth.  
In late modernity, there is a second step back from the background of 
the (ideal) audience dependant characterisation of truthfulness or the 
value of truth in the discourse. We find the argument of the misuse  
of the language as a view that draws the lie out of the moral framework 
(as morally neutral) on our cognitive capacity of dreaming, of a 
rhetorical embellishing of words and of an interesting poetic illusion, 
that is a poetic capacity, different from the general and main aim of 
language. The original idea is that we could imagine some liars as being 
involved in an activity that certainly uses the language in non-common 
way, in a ludic and perhaps private way, that could be seen as creative 
and imaginative, but not focusing on wrongful intentions aimed at 
fooling others in order to extract some benefit or inflict some prejudice 
                                                          
121 « Le principe moral que dire la vérité est un devoir, s’il était pris de manière 
absolue et isolée, rendrait toute société impossible [...]. Dire la vérité est un 
devoir. Qu’est-ce qu’un devoir ? L’idée de devoir est inséparable de celle de 
droits : un devoir est ce qui, dans un être, correspond aux droits d’un autre. Là 
où il n’y a pas de droits, il n’y a pas de devoirs. Dire la vérité n’est donc un 
devoir qu’envers ceux qui ont droit à la vérité. Or nul homme n’a droit à la 
vérité qui nuit à autrui. » Contant, B. (1797): Des réactions politiques, quoted 
from: Lequan, Mai (2002): « Existe-t-il un droit de mentir ? Actualité de la 
controverse Kant/Constant », Études 2004/2 (Tome 400), p. 140. 
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or harm. In the next section we will present this view of the misuse of 
the language in an extra-moral sense more in details, as a linguistic 
hermeneutic view and question ourselves whether it still makes sense to 
speak about misuse of language and how far the term lie is appropriate if 
nobody else is being fooled.  
We find in Bok (1978/1980) and Dietz (2002) that it might not be so 
easy to just say that we could put under brackets the ideal audience in a 
communication process because of ‘the domino theory of the lie’ that 
states, on the contrary that lie cannot be morally neutral. The direct 
consequence of a lie is the destruction of the public trust. But this view 
doesn’t suppose, as Dietz observes it correctly, that there should be a 
strict interdiction of lie. There could be ‘a standard of acceptability of 
the lie, in at least one single occasion and as case of urgency122’ (Bok 
1978, 1980; Dietz, 2002). Depending on what we understand by public 
sphere, trust in the public sphere takes different connotations, depending 
on whether we define the public common ground on a liberal 
background of benefit related collaboration (as with Locke), on mutual 
recognition and a community based understanding of human activities 
(with Hegel), on a common good or virtue based framework (Aristotle, 
Macintyre), a utility based understanding of public interest (Bentham, 
Mill), or on an unconscious Will-to-Live (Schopenhauer) etc.   
We are particularly interested in the modern philosophical 
ethical (but not necessarily religious) view of social life elaborated on 
the notion of mutual recognition, for the obvious reason that it could 
help us to define the idea reconciliation of the self. Mutual recognition is 
founding reconciliation, based on an ethical understanding of the 
personal identity (‘of duties toward one self’, ‘Pflichten gegen sich 
selbst’). It opens the perspective to draw a relation between the topic of 
the lie, self-abusing the self and helps to realise that reconciliation is not 
                                                          
122 Bok, Sissela (1978), Lügen: Vom täglichen Zwang zur Unaufrichtigkeit, 
Reinbeck, 1980. 
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possible without presupposing a clarification of the difference between 
both the lie and self-abusing. 
This optic shows that personal identity and integrity requires for 
preservation some rational capacities, and relies on the crucial 
importance of social recognition for the development. Lying, we now 
understand, could be considered as rational only under certain strict 
conditions, the limits in which the liar doesn’t run the risk of being 
deceived by his lie, which brings back the key notion of an ideal 
audience, that is the standard to evaluate the level of acceptability, in 
relation to the social construction of the framework of mutual 
recognition and esteem. Kant refers to the weakness of the capacity of 
understanding and grounds the modern perspective on the lie, in slightly 
different ways, in the Doctrine of rights and the Doctrine of virtues, 
where harmless consequences also qualify for being called lies, giving a 
rather harsh connotation to the word123.  
Hegel produces a social ethical structure of life, built on the circle of 
the proto-ethical understanding of life in the family, and explains the 
basic structure of rights, that are individually interdepending in nature 
and how rights are related to self-development of our capacities and 
ethical values in time. Let us come back to why the development of 
talents is important in the context of the lie.  
There are two perspectives in Kant’s Groundwork toward the ethical 
obligation not to lie and toward the limit up to which omitting to 
develop all our rational capacities, including the maxim of not to lie, 
could be understandable, because although I cannot will a talentless 
world rationally, there are no rational situation where all human beings 
should be expected to develop all possible talents at the same time. Let’s 
briefly clarify Kant’s view on why lie should be forbidden on the ground 
of the categorical imperative and the moral law, and then see the aporia 
of limitations in ‘time, interest, energy’ to develop my talents as Johnson 
                                                          
123 Kant, I. (1797), ibid. 
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and Cureton (2017) pointed out in their important analysis of Kant’s 
moral views on the lie124.    
Although the lie could be understood either as duties toward one self 
(as we will see extensively below), it can be also seen as duty toward 
others, and as a perfect duty which corresponds to the rule: ‘not to act in 
ways resulting in logical or practical contradictions when universalised’. 
For example, we have a perfect duty not to steal, since the maxim ‘It is 
permissible to steal’ is contradictory as universal law125. In the same 
way, if we understand the lie on the model of failing to keep a promise, 
then it becomes obvious for Kant that lies can be defined as his rule-
based consequentialist ethics requires, - as any maxim or rule, by the 
condition that it meets the capacity of being universalised in the form of 
a universal law, as the essential condition of what Kant calls the 
categorical imperative (G 4:421126). As Johnson et alii point out:  
‘The maxim of lying whenever it gets you what you want 
generates a contradiction once you try to combine it with the 
universalized version that all rational agents must, by a law of 
nature, lie when doing so gets them what they want.’ (Johnson, 
ibid.) 
                                                          
124 Johnson, Robert and Cureton, Adam, ‘Kant's Moral Philosophy’, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/kant-
moral/>. 
125 ‘Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, i.e. as the ground of 
an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that the command: thou 
shalt not lie, does not just hold for human beings only, as if other rational beings 
did not have to heed it; and so with all remaining actual moral laws; hence that 
the ground of the obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human 
being, or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori 
solely in concepts of pure reason’. Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals (2012), Preface, 4:389, Cambridge University Press, p.5. 
126 Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421, ibid. 
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On the contrary, if we introduce, instead of the paradigm of the 
promise keeping the framework of the human being as rational agent 
that is developing his rational capacities, that are not all given a priori 
and put into practice in an ideal context, but pointing out a situation 
where some of these capacities lack either time, energy or interest: 
‘we can easily conceive of adopting a maxim of refusing to 
develop any of our talents in a world in which that maxim is a 
universal law of nature. It would undoubtedly be a world more 
primitive than our own, but pursuing such a policy is still 
conceivable in it. However, it is not, Kant argues, possible to 
rationally will this maxim in such a world.’ 127 
This Kantian interpretation is slightly different from self-
development seen as based on some talents that grow under 
circumstances of a divine grace, and that are correlated to the creation of 
some new responsibilities. We find in the Gospel of Matthew 14-30 the 
idea of a process of development of responsibilities and capacities: 
 ‘You knew that I reap harvest where I did not sow and gather 
crops where I did now scatter seeds?  Well, you should have 
deposited my money in the bank and I would have received it 
with interest when I returned’.  
This situation entails the new challenge of keeping one’s promise, 
and not to lie or hid one’s responsibility, knowing that the situation has 
changed; development is organically given, one doesn’t need to make a 
choice about what type of development one would prefer; this situation 
is well described by the father James Alberione (1884-1971), founder of 
the Society of St Paul: 
‘Where there is talent, there is responsibility as well. As the 
talents grow day by day, that is, as graces increase, so does our 
                                                          
127 Johnson, ibid. 
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responsibility. It does become imperative to progress and no 
stagnate.’ 
For Kant’s explanation, the reason why it is not rational to think a 
world where rational beings voluntarily fail to develop some of their 
capacities is that it is not rational not to develop all possible capacities 
and to aim at a less perfect existence, if we would have the choice to get 
a fully perfect existence. Either we need judicious picking of the talents 
that best suit our situation given the limits of our concrete living 
conditions, or suppose that we are rationally required to develop all our 
talents, which would join the former view that development is 
organically given (by God’s grace): 
‘Then, there seems to be no need to go further [..] to show that 
refusing to develop talents is immoral. Given that, insofar as 
we are rational, we must will to develop capacities, it is by this 
very fact irrational not to do so.’ 128 
We see that Kant’s explanation of the immorality of the lie, that is 
heavily based on our duty to develop our rational capacity needs some 
additional conceptual clarifications on the unconscious subjective 
historical drive, that makes the whole process a process of development 
in tension, and also a process that can be transcended and overcome 
under some precise conditions. We need to introduce here the poetic 
dimension of this unconscious process of subjective (individual and 
collective) drives.  
5.2.2 Earth Ethics as New Way to Reconcile the Self with a New 
Kairos in an Non-Christian Way with Nietzsche  
One of the original propositions developed by Nietzsche, apart from 
his sophisticated philosophy of rhetoric and poetry, is to transpose a 
                                                          
128 Johnson, ibid. Reference to J. Alberione:  http://loveofstpaul.blogspot.ch/ 
2009/03/saturday-march-21-2009.html 
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global ethics, that is an ethics of the world related to theological and 
political affiliations, into a geo-philosophy or an earth ethics (Schapiro, 
2016)129. Reconciliation of ourselves should first be understood as 
philosophy of the future, or positioning ourselves toward ‘great events’, 
transformative ways of transcending ourselves, our networks of 
conventional and statist ideals, into new ‘great events’, in inhabiting the 
earth in dynamical ways (one requires mobility in any possible forms) 
(ibid). Earth is the centre, of an ethics of the future, cultivating an 
openness, and displacing the way thinking in petty environments serves 
conservative power balances, hostile to radical transformations of our 
earthly habitation. The garden is a space that promotes a hedonistic 
happiness where, as Schapiro shows: ‘the dominant themes are the 
shaping and tending of the natural, with a view to produce a rewarding 
result as well as the enjoyment of an earthly site130’. The garden is 
related to the innocence of the being, as all human beings have been 
given a natural place for living in the Garden of Eden, but Nietzsche 
‘rewrites this narrative and its topos without God or sin’ (ibid, p.136). 
‘Garden happiness’ is not an apology of a sensualist ethics, but a place 
to think the futurity of the human ethos, as becoming without debt 
(‘Unschuld des Werdens’). Nietzsche overcomes the sensual 
understanding of the garden in Zarathustra: ‘‘The Three Evils’: 
‘Sensuality: for free hearts innocent and free, the garden-happiness of 
the earth, all futures’ exuberance of thanks to the now’, as retroactive 
effect of the future on the present, as if the future was in preparation and 
that some sight of the prospective time were given in the present (ibid. 
p.135).    
The historical role of the garden to form modern aesthetics, not only 
as living poetry and place of natural harmony, but as ethical laboratory 
                                                          
129 Schapiro, Gary (2016): Nietzsche’s Earth: Great Events, Great Politics, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
130 Schapiro, ibid., pp. 150-1. 
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for an ethics of taste, an ethics of early education, an ethics of good life 
as healthy embodiment of earthly energies through physical activities, 
and psycho-therapy through all sorts of repetitive tasks related to 
gardening, philosophy of climate and humoral medicine, philosophy of 
the seasons, world transformation as earthly self-transmutation of the 
garden, economic ethics as place where we learn how to serve the place 
where we live in simplicity and authenticity, etc.     
Part of this reconciliation programme with the earth and the 
multidisciplinary value related cultivation of our garden relates to an 
inner garden, an interior development of the self. Sovereignty of the 
human will over nature should be viewed not only as a pluralistic 
method for civilizing natural forces, but also as work of the reason on 
the behalf of reason (Schapiro, p. 162), to shape new metanarratives, to 
find new kairos, new peaceful realisations of the self that builds 
concepts expected to last for centuries. Nietzsche is critical of the early 
apocalyptic Christian invention of St. Paul, of the faith being 
disappointed and turned rigorously to embrace a religion started out of 
an unworldly foundation, and that Christian faith should ultimately be 
found in the strong motive of a redemption ethics starting a new world 
history. But it is far from clear why we could not find a common 
ground, between both the Christian and Nietzsche’s way of realising 
reconciliation, since after all, this is all about reconciliation. Let’s go 
back to the notion of self-development and see how it could be related to 
a poetic earth related narrative that would as well secure some important 
aspects of the heritage of a Christian ethics.    
5.2.3 Self-Development in a Hermeneutically Given Unconscious 
Poetical Heritage and our Given Pragmatic Transcendence 
The framework of a normative oriented transcendental hermeneutic 
is based on the romantic understanding of poetry (as for example in a 
garden poetry, or an earth poetry, etc.), where the poetic dimension of 
language is not produced by learned elites but by a largely unconscious 
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cultural, socio-psychological background of life on earth. This poetic 
concept of language was first described by Giambattista Vico (1668-
1744). In order to overcome some shortfalls of this framework, and end 
up opposing Christian reconciliation, as redemption related and 
Nietzsche’s redemption as forming a prehistory of reconciliation, which 
integrates a deep cultural ethical dimension, one could find in the 
transcendence and in a pragmatic turn of the language, a common point 
of relation and mutual accommodation, as Karl-Otto Apel has 
interestingly suggested. 
The first men were poets by necessity, says Vico, who thinks the 
images of a given language are not essentially spiritual inventions of 
writers and philosophers but results of concrete needs of the people 
(Apel, Vico, p. 345)131. This non humanistic conception of the language, 
which gives a deep psycho-sociological axiology to our values, doesn’t 
depend only on formal universal rules, but as well on concrete means to 
appropriate ethical standards by cultural communities, as Nietzsche also 
sees by the medium of his earth ethics. But this experimental position 
should be enlarged by a pragmatic ethical layer, that opens a dimension 
of transcendence and ethical values on the ground of this popular 
knowledge that we all share, and this is given in mostly one culture, 
related to one language at a time but is open to as many languages and 
cultures as possible, by the simple fact that the spiritual images of a 
                                                          
131 „in der Topik, Metaphorik, Allegorik der humanistischen Bildungspoesie und 
-Rhetorik die humane und schon auf den aufgeklärten Verstand bezogenen 
Endphase eines ungeheuren und wilden, aber schöpferischen Phantaisezeitalters 
[...], einer Zeit, in der all Verhaltensweisen des Menschen: Recht, Gesittung, 
Kriegsführung, Wirtschaft, Religion durchaus dichterisch waren“. Quoted from 
Woidich, Stefanie (2007): Vico und die Hermeneutik: Eine 
rezeptionsgeschichtliche Annäherung, K&N, note 1062, p. 305. See also: 
Pender, E. E. ‘Plato on Metaphors and Models’ in: Metaphor, Allegory, and the 
Classical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions, G. R. Boys-Stones 
(ed.), OUP, 2003. 
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language are also excellent candidates for cultural intermediation, as 
bridges across cultures. 
5.2.4 Philosophical Correction of Civil Use of Language 
and the Poetic Language of Concepts ‘Begriffsdichtung’ 
There is a first distinction, found in early Modern philosophy, 
between conceptual language and rhetorical or poetic language, as we 
find in Locke’s philosophical opposition between the two meanings of 
words for human being: ‘a civil use’ and a ‘philosophical use’: the first 
being related to the communication of ideas by the means of words, ‘in 
the context of ordinary civil life’ in different societies where human 
being are related one to the other; the second use of words is a true 
philosophical use of words, as one should do if one would want ‘to give 
precise notions of things’. Human spirit should certainly use this second 
type of language ‘to express in general propositions truth that are 
beyond doubt and on which the mind could rely and get satisfied with in 
his quest for truth132’.  
Knowledge which is a conceptual knowledge, constructed by a 
philosophical use of words, is opposed to the ordinary language and 
rhetorical or poetical language that certainly embellish, persuade but that 
needs philosophical corrections to be reliable133. If we draw an analogy 
between the rhetorical use of language open to conceptual and 
philosophical correction, such as we find in Locke’s antinomy, and the 
fact that lies are to some extent part of human nature, then the definition 
of lying could be essentially found as related to the intention to deceive 
(‘the untruthfulness’ and ‘addressee’ conditions). Mahon expresses it 
                                                          
132 Locke, J. Philosophical Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, 
Ch. IX, §3. Oxford: UP, Oxford World's Classics, 1689/2008. 
133 See: my PhD thesis on the various ways poetic and metaphorical languages 
are understood by modern and romantic philosophers. Haaz, Ignace (2006): 
Nietzsche et la métaphore cognitive, Coll. Epistémologie et philosophie des 
sciences, L'Harmattan, pp. 119, 84. 
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below, in his definition and the four systematic characteristics of a lie: 
‘To lie = def.: to make a believed-false statement to another 
person with the intention that the other person believes that 
statement to be true.  
[…] there are at least four necessary conditions for lying. First, 
lying requires that a person make a statement (statement 
condition). Second, lying requires that the person believe the 
statement to be false; that is, lying requires that the statement be 
untruthful (untruthfulness condition). Third, lying requires that 
the untruthful statement be made to another person (addressee 
condition). Fourth, lying requires that the person intend that that 
other person believe the untruthful statement to be true (intention 
to deceive the addressee condition)134.’ 
On the contrary, if we follow with Blumenberg the idea that some 
metaphorical figures are better ways for making truth statements than 
the language of propositions, we need to consider poetry self-deceiving 
as ordinary language, but contrary to ordinary language it is not that it is 
loaded with ideological fallacies and misleading simplifications. 
Poetical figures are self-deceiving because of the incommunicability of 
some emotions, without the system of a standardized and well accepted 
language. But metaphors can also be seen as an appropriate linguistic 
vehicle for that what is given under metaphors and rhetorical tropes, 
which is the nearest to the truth (and the farthest from ideologies).  
We come close to a second distinction, found in Romantic philosophy, 
where philosophical knowledge is related to a language of concepts that 
belongs to the domain of the poetry. Metaphysical understanding of 
                                                          
134 Mahon, James Edwin, ‘The Definition of Lying and Deception’,  
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/lying-
definition/>. 
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ethical emotions belongs on one side to the domain of our emotional 
determinations; on the other side it is essentially ‘religious edification’ 
and metaphysic as art that opens the creative space of ‘the art of a poetry 
of concepts’, and where ‘metaphysic has nothing to do either as 
religious or artistic with the truth in itself’ following Schlimgen135. If as 
network of tropes and metaphors philosophical language should be 
essentially related to our emotional capacity, not to form culpable 
intentions to deceive others by telling untruth statements, but on the 
contrary, to tell the most profound truth on value of life, given the 
premise that the person who does such ‘lies’ does a statements, that are 
far more accurate when it comes to form metaphysical values, than non-
metaphorical statements. Then, such ‘lies’, would in fact not qualify 
anymore for being ethically lies, provided that the person who ‘lies’ 
believe the statement to be truth, and there is an optimistic bet that the 
addressee shares this sophisticated poetic communication. 
5.3 The Romantic Logic, Epistemology of the Lie 
and the Value of Games and Spans for Knowledge 
Formation and Values  
Our mental life, we could say our deep neuropsychology, seeks 
patterns, but many are different from the evidence of causal relations.  
A central concept of the Romantic theory of knowledge is probably 
based on this simple observation136. The general strategy is to unveil the 
affective ground of an artistic and scientific creativity, as we introduced 
it in the previous paragraph, distinct from the cult of truth as the 
                                                          
135 See Hans Blumenberg (2010): Paradigms for a Metaphorology, Transl. 
Robert Savage, Cornell University Press. Schlimgen, E. (2000): ‘Logik’ in: 
Nietzsche Handbuch, Henning Ottmann (Ed.), Stuttgart: Metzler Verl. p. 276. 
136 Main representatives of this Romantic tradition are Neokantian 
Schopenhauerian philosophers, but we find evidence of similar views as well by: 
Vico, Humboldt and Gerber. Cf. also Nietzsche et la métaphore cognitive, ibid. 
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supposed key epistemic value.  
The assumption is that there is blindness due to lack of attention, or 
lack of mental focus due to changes, when we analyse the psychological 
cognitive conditions of knowledge formation, which are proceeding in 
very conventional and repetitive ways. Romantic knowledge formation 
on the contrary reconnects with a subjective grounding of our concepts. 
It is subjective because logical categories: as identity and non-
contradiction belong essentially to mental life, before getting a practical 
transcription in social interactions. Non-contradiction, that is based on a 
subjectively constituting experience (as opposed to a purely subjective 
or solipsist notion of knowledge) should also always be based on a 
correspondence theory of truth, that states that there is a semantic 
pretention of truth, and there is no denial of the value of the opposition 
between true and lie, truth and contradiction, as we presented it in what 
we called the Modern view. How far could truth be seen as redundant? 
If we follow the proposition of Nietzsche, in his On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense, we would find ourselves totally in the other extreme, 
where any truth statement is virtually redundant:  
‘Every word immediately becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is 
not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly 
individualized original experience to which it owes its birth, but 
must at the same time fit innumerable, more or less similar 
cases—which means, strictly speaking, never equal—in other 
words, a lot of unequal cases. Every concept originates through 
our equating what is unequal137’. 
We understand in comparable views, found in the Romantic logic, 
that concepts doesn’t derive rationally, as logically founding 
proposition, in some cases. Let’s note that the regulative notion of 
                                                          
137 Nietzsche, F. (1873/1976): On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, Walter 
Kaufmann's transl., The Portable Nietzsche, Viking Press, 46. 
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logical identity or of logical non-contradiction doesn’t necessarily lose 
all meaning, on the contrary we would be tempted to say, the main 
finding of Romantic epistemology is in showing us how observation is 
key in order to find mnemonic solutions to problems, including how we 
understand and transmit concepts in ways similar to Simonides of Ceos 
(c.556-c.468 B.C.E.)138. 
Idris Aberkane uses the concept of a ‘span’, of the width of human 
hand: the distance from the end of the thumb to that of the little finger, 
to represent the utility to base our method of valuation and knowledge 
formation, on sensual means of ordering them and representing 
knowledge subjectively. As for mnemonic, truth has its utility but truth 
needs to be placed in linguistic packaging that helps us to make the best 
use of it. 
There is a great interest to discover an autonomous world of thought 
and a subjectively bound world of representations, under the conditions: 
1) that a non-communicability of subjective representations, or the 
untruthfulness of images need to be excluded (otherwise if it is not 
possible anymore to figure out the utility of the representation or the 
‘lie’ if we use it to cheat, and risk to lose the trust of others)139;  
2) secondly there should be an epistemic value given to the interplay of 
research formation and results, and more generally to the model 
of a game as the modus operandi of scientific knowledge formation, by 
opposition to an industrialized process of knowledge and values, based 
                                                          
138 On Simonides see: Cicero, De Oratore, II, lxxxvi. The greatest opponent to 
this view is G. Frege, by showing a=a is different from a=b, in the same way as 
3x4=12 differs from Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens. Some identity statements 
need further enquiries in order to confirm the identity; therefor there are 
different semantic relations to explain significance and logic is not purely formal 
as for Kant, but it relates to knowledge formation and concepts, without 
extending concepts to subjectively based forms. 
139 See Schlimgen, E. (2000): Logik in: Nietzsche Handbuch, Henning Ottmann 
(Ed.), Metzler Verl. p. 276. 
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on well-known models. 3) There are strong evidences in 
neuropsychology and cognitive sciences that education and research 
should move on the ground of a poetic interplay of concepts, what some 
call ‘neuro-ergonomics’, a way to study the brain at work, to open and 
liberate the human nervous system and the brain, in our understanding 
of emerging knowledge and values, the unveiling of blind spots and the 
highlighting of unexpected springs of knowledge formation and ethical 
values adaptation and resistance.  
The poetic and mnemonic power to enhance performance and 
expand capacities is real. New capacities to produce and cherish 
knowledge in interaction are to be explored. A knowledge that includes 
sagacity is vital, because poetic knowledge and values show the priority 
to focus on the dynamic interplay, in a time when the temptation of 
trusting artificial intelligence, automated systems is emerging, and when 
moralizing educational failures is greater than ever, because the 
quantitative expansion of knowledge is itself becoming problematic. 
After hundred thousand years of evolution of the brain and our capacity 
to build on mental representations – our inner poetry capacity, we still 
have the temptation to ignore it, for the sake of being more scientific. 
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